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Abstract 
 
Recently developed models of fairness can explain a wide variety of seemingly contradictory 
facts. The most controversial and yet unresolved issue in the modeling of fairness preferences 
concerns the behavioral relevance of fairness intentions. Intuitively, fairness intentions seem 
to play an important role in economic relations, political struggles and legal disputes. Yet, so 
far there is little rigorous evidence supporting this intuition. In this paper we provide clear 
and unambiguous experimental evidence for the behavioral relevance of fairness intentions. 
Our results indicate that the attribution of fairness intentions is important both in the domain 
of negatively reciprocal behavior and in the domain of positively reciprocal behavior. This 
means that reciprocal behavior cannot be fully captured by equity models that are exclusively 
based on preferences over the distribution of material payoffs. Models that take into account 
players’ fairness intentions and distributional preferences are consistent with our data while 
models that focus exclusively on intentions or on the distribution of material payoffs are not.  
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I. Introduction 
A considerable body of evidence indicates that a substantial number of the people are 
motivated by concerns for fairness and reciprocity. Moreover, the presence of fair-minded 
people is likely to have important economic effects (Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler 1986; 
Camerer and Thaler 1995; Bewley 1999; Fehr and Gächter 2000). This has led to the 
development of several fairness models (Rabin 1993; Levine 1998; Dufwenberg and 
Kirchsteiger 1999; Falk and Fischbacher 1999; Fehr and Schmidt 1999; Bolton and 
Ockenfels 2000; Charness and Rabin 2000). These models share the property that some 
people are assumed to have a preference for fairness – in addition to their preference for 
material payoffs. The impressive feature of these models is that they are capable of predicting 
correctly a wide variety of seemingly contradictory facts.  
This paper examines the most controversial question in the modeling of fairness 
preferences: the role of fairness intentions. Do fair-minded people respond to fair or unfair 
intentions or do they respond solely to fair or unfair outcomes? One class of fairness models 
– the equity models of Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) – is based 
on the assumption that fairness intentions are behaviorally irrelevant. Another class of 
models (e.g., Rabin 1993, Falk and Fischbacher 1999, Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger 1999) 
assigns fairness intentions a major behavioral role.  
The answer to our question is of great practical and theoretical interest. At the 
theoretical level the question concerns not only the proper modeling of fairness preferences 
but also standard utility theory. Standard utility theory assumes that the utility of an action 
depends solely on the consequences of the action and not on the intention behind the action. 
Therefore, if the attribution of intentions turns out to be behaviorally important, the 
“consequentialism” inherent in standard utility models is also in doubt. At the practical level 
the issue is important because many relevant decisions are likely to be affected if the 
attribution of intentions matters. Fairness attributions are likely to influence decision-making 
in firms and other organizations as well as in markets and the political arena. Political 
decisions and business decisions, for instance, often affect the material payoffs of some 
parties negatively. If the response of the negatively affected parties also takes into account 
the decision-maker’s fairness intentions, it will be much easier to prevent opposition when 
the decision-maker can credibly claim that he is somehow forced – by law, by international 
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competition or by some other external force – to take the action. It is, therefore, no 
coincidence that the rhetoric of politicians and business leaders often appeals to the phrase 
that “there is no alternative”. If there is indeed no alternative it is not possible to attribute 
unfair intentions to the action because the decision-maker cannot be held responsible for the 
action. If, in contrast, there are obvious alternative actions available, it is much easier for the 
affected parties to attribute unfair intentions to the action and, as a consequence, their 
opposition will be much stronger.  
The attribution of intentions is also important in law (Huang 2000). Intentions often 
distinguish between whether the same action is a tort or a crime and whether a tort should 
involve punitive damages. Other distinctions made in criminal law concern whether an action 
is taken purposely, knowingly, recklessly, or negligently (see Model Penal Code § 2.02(1)-
(2)). Thus, the penal code (which represents a codified broad sense of justice) distinguishes 
quite carefully between the consequences of an action and the intentions underlying this 
action. 
Although, at the intuitive level, the attribution of intentions seems to be important, so 
far it has been rather difficult to provide rigorous and unambiguous evidence for this. This is 
not surprising with regard to field data because outcomes and intentions are usually 
inextricably intertwined in the field. Yet, even in laboratory experiments the issue has been 
quite elusive. Charness (1996), Bolton, Brandts and Ockenfels (1998), Offerman (1999) and 
Cox (2000) find little or no evidence that the attribution of fairness intentions matters in the 
domain of positively reciprocal behavior. Blount (1995) and Offerman (1999) find evidence 
that it matters in the domain of negatively reciprocal behavior but, as we will argue below, 
these studies have some methodological problems.1 Thus, we face the puzzle that, intuitively, 
the attribution of fairness intentions seems to be important while given the prevailing 
evidence, the issue remains highly controversial.  
In this paper we provide clear and unambiguous experimental evidence for the 
behavioral relevance of fairness attributions. Our results indicate that the attribution of 
fairness intentions is important both in the domain of negatively reciprocal behavior and in 
the domain of positively reciprocal behavior. When the experimental design rules out the 
attribution of fairness intentions, reciprocal responses are substantially weaker. This result is 
                                                 
1 Positive reciprocity is defined as a kind response to an action that leads to a fair outcome or is driven by fair 
intentions. Negative reciprocity is defined as a hostile response to an action that leads to an unfair outcome or is 
driven by an unfair intention.  
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corroborated at the individual as well as at the aggregate level. It is not only the case that 
some individuals show weaker reciprocal responses when it is impossible to attribute fairness 
intentions. A non-negligible fraction of the subjects (30 percent) exhibit no reciprocal 
behavior when fairness attributions are ruled out, i.e., they behave like selfish individuals. 
However, when the design allows for the attribution of fairness intentions no subject behaves 
in a fully selfish manner. This indicates that the recently developed equity models of Fehr 
and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) are incomplete because they neglect 
fairness intentions. The behavioral relevance of fairness intentions does, of course, not rule 
out that subjects also respond to unfair outcomes. Our results indicate that, on average, 
subjects exhibit reciprocal behavior even if they cannot attribute fairness intentions. Thus, 
models that are exclusively based on intention-driven reciprocal behavior (e.g., Rabin 1993; 
Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger 1999) are also incomplete. Models that combine both aspects 
(like e.g., Falk and Fischbacher 1999) fit our data best.  
Our experimental design also provides an opportunity to examine to what extent both 
positive and negative reciprocity is exhibited by the same individuals. To our knowledge 
there is no study that examines whether positive and negative reciprocity is correlated at the 
level of the individual. Previous studies can only answer the question whether a given 
individual exhibits a positively or a negatively reciprocal response. It turns out that – when 
fairness attributions are possible - 40 percent of the subjects exhibit both positively and 
negatively reciprocal responses. However, a surprisingly large fraction of 21 percent exhibit 
only positively reciprocal responses and 15 percent show only negatively reciprocal 
responses. 
The paper is organized as follows. The next section shortly discusses potential 
obstacles in finding behavioral effects of fairness intentions. Section III presents the 
experimental design. Section IV discusses the predictions of several fairness theories. Results 
are presented in Section V. Section VI gives a short summary.  
II. Obstacles for Finding Behavioral Effects of Fairness Intentions 
Before we present our experimental design it is important to discuss the potential reasons for 
the lack of convincing evidence in favor of fairness intentions. In our view, there are four 
potential reasons. The first reason is that in some studies there is a potential confound with 
the efficiency motive. Andreoni and Miller (2000), Bolle and Kritikos (1998) and Charness 
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and Rabin (2000) report results suggesting the presence of a non-negligible fraction of 
subjects that is willing to increase efficiency. These subjects seem to be willing to bear some 
cost in order to increase the total payoff, i.e., the sum of the payoffs that accrues to all the 
parties. This motive could have swamped the positively reciprocal responses in the studies of 
Charness (1996), Bolton, Brandts and Ockenfels (1998) and Offerman (1999) because in 
these studies the reciprocal behavior of the second-mover was associated with large 
efficiency increases. It is also possible that reciprocity motives and efficiency motives 
interact in a yet unknown way. For this reason our design rules out that reciprocal responses 
increase the total payoff.  
A second reason is related to the issue of repetition. In Charness (1996) subjects faced a 
different opponent in each of ten periods. Repetitions may create all sorts of ill-understood 
noise and spillovers across periods that make it difficult to isolate the attribution of fairness 
intentions. For this reason we conducted a one-shot experiment without any repetitions.  
A third potential reason for the lack of a behavioral impact of fairness intentions could 
be that the treatment manipulations were not strong enough. To isolate the role of fairness 
intentions one ideally needs a treatment in which first-movers can signal their fairness 
intentions and a treatment in which such signals are ruled out completely. The signaling of 
fairness intentions rests on two premises: (i) The first-mover’s choice set actually allows the 
choice between a fair and an unfair action, and (ii) the first-mover’s choice is under the full 
control of the first-mover. The first premise implies that the treatment manipulation can be 
“too weak” because the choices available to the first-mover may not be sufficiently different, 
i.e., the fairness or unfairness of the available actions is not salient enough. In our design we 
solved this problem by giving the first-mover a choice set that allows for very different 
actions. In particular, the first-mover could either increase or decrease the second-movers 
payoff relative to a clearly defined reference point (i.e., relative to an initial endowment that 
was the same for both players). This distinguishes our study from the studies of Charness 
(1996), Bolton, Brandts and Ockenfels (1998) and Cox (2000) where the first movers could 
only be more or less kind to the second-movers but they could not hurt them. Perhaps, the 
distinction between being more or less kind was not salient enough and, as a consequence, 
there was little or no intention-driven reciprocal behavior in these studies.  
The fourth reason is related to the second premise above. It concerns the question of 
how one can rule out the attribution of fairness intentions to the first mover’s choice. In our 
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view the strongest method is to deprive the first mover of any choice at all and to make this 
salient to the second mover. In our experiment we achieved this by determining the first 
mover’s “action” by a salient random device. Saliency was implemented by rolling dice in 
front of each second mover. Yet, if the first mover’s choice is determined by a random 
device, the second movers might have views about what constitutes fair or unfair random 
devices. For example, if the random device determines with high probability a very bad 
outcome for the second mover, the second mover may become angry because she views this 
as a rather unfair device. If, in contrast, human first movers are unlikely to choose such a bad 
outcome the comparison of responses across the random device and the human choice 
condition does not isolate the impact of fairness intentions. The reason is that there is likely 
to be a confound due to the angry response to an unfair random device. Our solution of this 
problem is to implement a random device that mimics the probability distribution over the 
actions of human first movers.  
Both in Blount (1995) and Offerman (1999) the first mover’s “action” was determined 
by a random device. Yet, only Blount kept the probability distribution of first mover actions 
constant across the random device and the human choice condition. Although the study of 
Blount is very clean and convincing in this regard it faces other methodological problems. 
The results of her ultimatum game may be affected by the fact that subjects in the human 
choice condition had to make decisions as a proposer and as a responder before they were to 
know their actual roles. After subjects had made their decisions in both roles, the role for 
which they received payments was determined randomly. This means that the decision 
situation was not kept constant across the random device and the human choice condition 
because in the human choice condition the responders also had to put themselves in the shoes 
of the proposers while in the random device condition this was not the case. 
In one of Blount's treatments deception was involved. Subjects believed that there were 
proposers although in fact the experimenters made the proposals. All subjects in this 
condition were “randomly” assigned to the responder role. It may well be the case that this 
kind of deception cannot be hidden from the subjects, i.e., at least a number of subjects might 
have noticed that they were deceived. In contrast to this setting subjects in our experiment 
knew their role in all conditions before they made decisions and we had real human subjects 
in the first-mover position and in the second-mover position.  
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III. Experimental Design and Procedures 
Our experimental design is based on the “moonlighting game” (Abbink, Irlenbusch and 
Renner 2000). This game has the advantage that we can examine the impact of fairness 
intentions on positively as well as on negatively reciprocal responses at the individual level. 
In the following we first describe the moonlighting game. Then we present our two 
treatments, the Intention treatment and the No-Intention treatment. Finally, we report the 
procedures of the experiment. 
The constituent game. The “moonlighting game” is a two-player sequential move game that 
consists of two stages. At the beginning of the game, both players are endowed with 12 
points. At the first stage player A chooses an action a ∈ {-6, -5, …, 5, 6}. If A chooses a ≥ 0, 
he gives player B a tokens while if he chooses a < 0, he takes away |a| tokens from B. In case 
of a ≥ 0 the experimenter triples a so that B receives 3a. If a < 0 A reaps |a| and player B 
loses |a|. After player B observes a, she can choose an action b ∈ {-6, -5, …, 17, 18} at the 
second stage, where b ≥ 0 is a reward and b < 0 is a sanction. A reward transfers one point 
from B to A. A sanction costs B exactly |b| but reduces A’s income by 3|b|. After B’s 
decision, final incomes are determined. Since As can give and take while Bs can reward or 
sanction, this game allows for both, positively and negatively reciprocal behavior. 
In our experiment we applied the strategy method. This means that player B had to give 
us a response for each feasible action of player A, before B was informed about the actual 
choice of A. This has several advantages2. First, it allows us to examine the correlation 
between positive and negative reciprocity at the individual level. Thus, we know whether 
there are subjects who exhibit only negatively reciprocal responses or only positively 
reciprocal responses, or whether those who are negatively reciprocal are also positively 
reciprocal. Second, as we will see, the strategy method allows us to study the relevance of 
intentions for reciprocal behavior at any level of a. This is so because we have sufficiently 
many responses to each feasible action of A. 
Treatments. As discussed above, A’s action signals fairness intentions if (i) A’s choice set 
allows the choice between saliently fair and saliently unfair decisions, and (ii) if A’s choice is 
                                                 
2 In principle, it is possible that the strategy method induces a different behavior of B relative to a situation 
where B has to respond to the actual move of A. However, Brandts and Charness (1998) and Cason and Mui 
(1998) report evidence indicating that the strategy method does not induce different behavior. Moreover, we 
used the strategy method in both of our treatments. Therefore, the impact of this method, if there is any, is kept 
constant across treatments.  
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under the full control of A. Condition (i) is guaranteed by our experimental game since it 
allows A to give or to take different amounts of money. Condition (ii) is our treatment 
variable. In the Intention treatment (I-treatment) A himself determines a. Thus, in the I-
treatment A is responsible for the consequences of his action and, therefore, his action signals 
good intentions (if a > 0) or bad intentions (if a < 0). In the No-intention treatment (NI-
treatment), on the other hand, A’s move is determined by a random device. Consequently, A 
has no control over his action. His action therefore signals neither good nor bad intentions. 
The random move of A in the NI-treatment was implemented as follows: After B had 
determined her strategy, the experimenter went to her place and threw two dice in front of B. 
Both dice were ten-sided showing numbers from 0 to 9, i.e., together they created numbers 
between zero and 99 with equal probability. The number that was determined was then used 
to determine the move of A according to Table 1. For example, if the dice showed a number 
between 0 and 6, A’s random move was to take 6 points (a = -6), while if the number was, 
e.g., 58, player A’s move was a = 3. After the move of A had been determined, the 
experimenter went to another player B and threw the dice again. This procedure was 
explained to the Bs in great detail in the instructions. Thus, it was completely transparent to 
each B that A’s move was determined randomly according to Table 1. Players A also knew 
that their choice would be randomly determined but they did not know the probability 
distribution.  
Notice that according to Table 1 the randomly determined moves of A are not equally 
likely. For example, it is more likely to randomly select a = -6 (7 percent chance) than a = -5 
(2 percent chance). Table 1 is based on the actual human decisions of the As who 
participated in the moonlighting experiment by Abbink, Irlenbusch and Renner (2000). Using 
this table we are able to approximate a ‘human choice distribution’ even in the NI-treatment 
where choices were randomly selected. To keep everything constant except the potential for 
the attributions of intentions across the NI- and the I-treatment, the choice distribution given 
in Table 1 was also presented to the Bs in the I-condition3. In this condition it was pointed 
out to the Bs that the same experiment had already been conducted before and that the 
relative frequency of the decisions by the As in that experiment was identical to the 
frequencies in Table 1. This was done to induce players B to have the same beliefs about the 
choice distribution of the As in both treatment conditions. In this way we ruled out the 
possibility that the responses of the Bs were affected by different beliefs about the choice 
                                                 
3 As in the NI-treatment, the As were not informed about the choice distribution in Table 1. 
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distribution of the As.4 Thus, with regard to the probability distribution over the set of 
feasible actions the two treatments cannot evoke different fairness judgements.  
 
Table 1: Probability distribution of the move of A in the NI-treatment 
Realized 
number 
A’s move a Percent 
0-6 -6 7 
7-8 -5 2 
9-15 -4 7 
16-19 -3 4 
20-21 -2 2 
22-26 -1 5 
27-39 0 13 
40-46 1 7 
47-55 2 9 
56-62 3 7 
63-73 4 11 
74-75 5 2 
76-99 6 24 
 
Procedure. Before the game started, subjects were randomly assigned to their role as player 
A or B (in both treatments). They were seated in front of their terminal and given their 
instructions. To ensure the understanding of the experimental procedures all subjects had to 
answer several control questions and the experiment did not start until all subjects had 
answered all questions correctly. Procedures and payoff functions were known by all the 
players, i.e., they were explained in the instructions and orally summarized. We used the 
experimental software z-Tree (Fischbacher 1999) to run the experiments. 
IV. Predictions 
In the following we derive the theoretical predictions for our experimental game. First, we 
shortly present the economic prediction based on the assumption that it is common 
knowledge that all players are selfish and rational followed by the predictions of recently 
developed fairness theories. 
 
                                                 
4 We also checked whether the distribution of realized choices in the I-treatment and the NI-treatment differ. 
Based on a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test the null hypothesis of identical distributions cannot be rejected (p = 
0.289). 
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Self Interest Prediction. If it is common knowledge that all players are selfish and rational 
the following subgame perfect equilibrium outcome is predicted: In both treatments B will 
always choose b = 0, i.e., she will neither punish nor reward, because any other choice is 
costly. Therefore, in the I-treatment player A will choose a = -6 because he only loses if he 
chooses a > 0 and has nothing to fear if a < 0. In the NI-treatment, player A’s move is 
determined by a random device. 
 
Fairness Predictions. We now turn to the predictions of recently developed fairness theories. 
Our focus is the behavior of player B. The models by Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) and Fehr 
and Schmidt (1999) are built on the assumption that subjects dislike inequity. In the Bolton 
and Ockenfels model inequity averse players have a concern for a fair relative share of the 
total payoffs. The fair relative share is defined as 1/n where n is the number of players in the 
game. If a player receives less than the fair relative share he tries to increase his share and 
vice versa. According to Fehr and Schmidt (1999) inequity averse players are concerned with 
the payoff differences between themselves and each other player. If player i’s earnings differ 
from that of player j, he aims at reducing the payoff difference between himself and j. Both 
models predict that for sufficiently strong inequity aversion people exhibit reciprocal 
behavior, i.e., b is increasing in a and b = 0 if a = 0. Common to both approaches is the 
neglect of intentions. Only the payoff consequences are assumed to explain reciprocal 
responses. For our experiment this implies that for a given move of A, reciprocal responses 
between the I-treatment and the NI-treatment should be exactly the same. Since the payoff 
consequences of A’s move are the same in both treatments, a player B who is solely 
concerned with payoff consequences should respond in the same way. 
A different concept of reciprocity starts with the premise that reciprocal responses are 
triggered exclusively by kind or unkind intentions (Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger 1999)5. 
From this premise it immediately follows that in the absence of fairness intentions there 
should be no reciprocal behavior at all, i.e., player B neither rewards nor punishes but 
pursues her material self-interest. Therefore, in the NI-treatment Dufwenberg and 
Kirchsteiger predict no reciprocal behavior at all (b = 0, ∀a). The prediction for the I-
treatment is less clear. The reason for this is that the model exhibits multiple equilibria and 
some of them are compatible with b being locally decreasing in a. This is so because 
                                                 
5 The model of Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger is based on Rabin’s (1993) normal form theory of fairness. Since 
the present game is a sequential game we restrict our analysis to the Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger theory of 
sequential reciprocity. 
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according to the model higher values of a do not necessarily signal more friendly intentions6. 
There are, however, plausible equilibria where a > 0 signals good intentions and a < 0 
signals bad intentions. In these equilibria b is increasing in a (in the I-treatment). 
Finally there is the model by Falk and Fischbacher (1999) that combines a concern for 
a fair distribution of payoffs with the reward and punishment of fair and unfair intentions. In 
the I-treatment the model makes the (unique) prediction that b is increasing in a. In the NI-
treatment, this reciprocal pattern is predicted to be weaker compared to the I-treatment. 
Contrary to Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, the model does not predict b = 0, ∀a since players 
in this model not only have a concern for intentions but also for a fair distribution of the 
payoffs. However, since intentions are absent in the NI-treatment subjects react less 
reciprocally than in the I-treatment. The latter prediction distinguishes Falk and Fischbacher 
from the inequity aversion models by Bolton and Ockenfels and Fehr and Schmidt. Table 2 
summarizes all predictions. Notice that all fairness theories make similar predictions in the I-
treatment but differ in their predictions for the NI-treatment. 
 
Table 2: Summary of predictions for player B 
Model I-treatment NI-treatment 
Standard prediction b = 0, ∀a b = 0, ∀a 
Only payoff consequences matter 
(Fehr/Schmidt and Bolton/Ockenfels) 
b increases in a exactly the same behavior 
as in I-treatment  
Only fairness intentions matter  
(Dufwenberg/Kirchsteiger) 
b increases in a7 b = 0, ∀a 
Payoff consequences and fairness 
intentions matter (Falk/Fischbacher) 
b increases in a b increases in a but less 
than in the I-treatment 
 
                                                 
6 To make this point clear, consider the following example. Assume that B believes that A expects B to punish a 
= -5 with b = -6 while B is expected not to punish a = -6. In this case, the expected payoffs of B, piB, are higher 
if a = -6 (piB = 6) than if a = -5 (piB = 1). This means that a = -6 does in fact signal more friendly intentions than 
a = -5, which in turn justifies the higher punishments. Thus, it is possible in the Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger 
model that a = -5 is punished more than a = -6 in equilibrium. 
7 See discussion in the text. 
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V. Results 
In total 112 subjects participated in the experiment (66 in the I-treatment and 46 in the NI-
treatment). All subjects were students from the University of Zurich or the Polytechnic 
University of Zurich, no economics students among them. The experiments were conducted 
in June 1998. 1 point in the experiment represented 1 Swiss Franc (CHF 1 ≈ .65 US$). 
Subjects received on average CHF 22.20 in the I-treatment and CHF 24.10 in the NI-
treatment (including a show-up fee of CHF 10). On average, the experiment lasted 45 
minutes. 
Our main result is shown in Figure 1.8 In this figure we plot the rewards and sanctions 
of B in both treatments, i.e., we show the impact of B’s decisions on A’s payoff for each 
possible action of A. For instance, if in the I-treatment A chooses a =  6 then A receives on 
average 6.55 points from B. The corresponding median value is 9 points. 
 
Figure 1: Rewards and sanctions of players B dependent on decisions of players A 
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8 In this section we restrict our attention to the behavior of players B. In the Appendix we also present player A 
decisions for the I-treatment and the random moves in the NI-treatment. 
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The figure reveals that in the I-treatment the Bs do reward and sanction the behavior of 
the As. Average and median rewards are increasing in the level of the transfer. Similarly, the 
more A takes away from B, the more B is willing to sanction. This behavioral pattern is in 
clear contradiction to the standard economic prediction (b = 0, ∀a). It is, however, well in 
line with the predictions of all fairness theories. 
Figure 1 also reveals that behavior is remarkably different in the NI-treatment 
compared to the I-treatment. On average sanctions and rewards are much weaker in the NI- 
than in the I-treatment. Only for sufficiently high or low values of a, average sanctions and 
rewards differ from zero in the NI-treatment. The treatment differences between the I- and 
the NI-treatment are even more pronounced if we look at the median behavior. In the NI-
treatment median behavior does not show any reciprocal pattern but completely coincides 
with the prediction of the self-interest model.  
Are the differences between the I-treatment and the NI-treatment statistically 
significant? Table 3 provides the answer. Similarly to Figure 1, it shows the impact of B’s 
decision on A’s payoff for all moves of A. In addition to the average and median impacts, it 
also shows quartile values.9 These distribution measures indicate that the reciprocal responses 
of the Bs are not only on average weaker in the NI-treatment but that the whole distribution 
is shifted towards zero. For example, if A chooses a = -6, average sanctions are lower (1.43 
instead of 8.09) but so are the first quartile, the median and the third quartile values. This 
holds (weakly) for all take-decisions. Similarly if A chooses, e.g., a = 4 not only average 
rewards are lower (1.65 instead of 4.58) in the NI-treatment, but also all distribution 
measures. Again, this holds (weakly) for all give-decisions. In the last row of Table 3, we 
present the results of the nonparametric Mann-Whitney U-test, which was run to check 
whether the decisions of the Bs are significantly different across treatments. For almost all a 
> 0 and a < 0, behavior is indeed significantly different across treatments at the five percent 
level. For a = 5 it is significant at the ten percent level. 
 
                                                 
9 Quartile values were determined in the following way. First all decisions of all Bs were sorted. The first 
quartile value represents the choice of the player B who is located at position 0.25, the median decision is that of 
B who is located at 0.5 and the third quartile is the decision of B at 0.75. 
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Table 3: Behavior of players B - Distribution measures and statistical significance 
Player A’s move a -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
I-treatment 
Average -8.09 -6.91 -5.97 -4.70 -2.97 -2.73 -0.88 1.24 1.73 2.64 4.58 3.64 6.55 
First quartile -18 -15 -12 -9 -6 -3 0 0 0 0 3 0 1 
Median -9 -9 -6 -6 -3 -3 0 2 3 4 6 6 9 
Third quartile 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 4 6 8 10 12 
NI-treatment 
Average -1.43 -2.35 -1.52 -2.26 -0.30 -0.57 -0.78 0.57 -0.39 -0.30 1.65 1.09 1.39 
First quartile 0 -3 -3 -6 -3 -3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Median 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Third quartile 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 5 5 7 8 
Significance of difference between 
treatments* 
.001 .016 .023 .025 .031 .032 .109 .032 .006 .017 .002 .069 .001 
 
* Significance is checked by means of the non-parametric Mann-Whitney U test. Numbers are p-values. Given our 
hypothesis that in the NI-treatment reciprocal responses are weaker than in the I-treatment, we used a one sided test (except 
for the (random) move of a = 0, where we have no such hypothesis.  
 
Given the results shown in Table 3 we can reject the predictions by Bolton and Ockenfels 
(2000) and Fehr and Schmidt (1999). Behavior in the NI-treatment is significantly different 
from that in the I-treatment for all give- and take-decisions. Put differently, our results 
indicate that on an aggregate level intentions matter both in the domain of positive as well as 
in the domain of negative reciprocity. 
The behavioral relevance of fairness intentions can also be shown with the help of 
regression analysis. Table 4 shows a regression model where the impact of B’s decision is 
regressed on A’s move (a). In this model we also include a dummy variable for the I-
treatment (I) and an interaction term a×I. This specification allows us to estimate different 
linear fits for the I- and for the NI-treatment and, thus, to asses the difference between the 
two treatments. The result of this regression is shown in Table 4. The coefficient of the 
interaction term a×I is highly significant while the dummy variable for the I-treatment (I) is 
not significantly different from zero. This means that for a = 0 there is no difference between 
the treatments but for sufficiently high or low a, the reciprocal responses of the Bs are 
stronger in the I-treatment compared with the NI-treatment. This result confirms the 
statistical test presented in Table 3. 
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Table 4: Regression with impact of B’s decision as dependent variable 
variable coefficient 
constant -.401 (.550) 
A’s decision a .295* (.157) 
dummy for I-treatment I -.522 (1.086) 
a × I .907*** (.222) 
Robust standard errors are in parenthesis (subject ID as cluster variable). There are 728 
observations in 56 clusters. The F-statistic equals 20.89; p < .001. *= significance at 10 
percent level; ***= significance at 1percent level. 
 
Furthermore, the regression allows us to test whether in the NI-treatment reciprocity is 
wiped out completely as predicted by Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (1999). Figure 1 shows 
that on average there are reciprocal choices for high enough give- and take-decisions, but is 
this reciprocal behavior significantly different from b = 0? The constant and the coefficient 
of a shown in Table 4 measure the behavior of the Bs in the NI-treatment. Notice that the 
constant is insignificant. If the random device determines a = 0, the Bs neither reward nor 
sanction on average. The coefficient of a is, however, positive and (weakly) significant. We 
thus conclude that, on average, Bs reward positive and sufficiently high a-values and 
sanction negative and sufficiently low a-values in the NI-treatment.10 Thus, even though 
reciprocal behavior is considerably weaker in the NI-treatment, there are also significant 
reciprocal responses in this treatment. This suggests that reciprocal behavior is not solely 
intention-driven, as assumed in Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (1999), but that fair outcomes 
also play a role. Therefore, approaches that model reciprocal behavior as a response to 
intentions and material consequences, like, e.g., Falk and Fischbacher (1999), organize our 
results best. 
So far we have restricted our analysis to aggregate behavior. However, since the Bs had 
to indicate a decision for each of A’s possible actions, we can also study individual patterns 
of behavior.11 The first column shows the percentage of subjects who neither reward nor 
sanction, i.e., whose behavior is in accordance with the standard economic prediction (b = 0, 
∀a). The second column reports the percentage of subjects who reward or sanction. The 
percentage of subjects who exhibit positive as well as negative reciprocity is given in column 
                                                 
10 To check the robustness of this finding, we also calculated the Spearman rank correlation between the average 
impact of B’s decisions on A’s payoff and the corresponding moves by A. The resulting coefficients are 0.8721 
for the NI-treatment and 0.9945 for the I-treatment. Both coefficients are significant at any conventional level (p 
< 0.001). 
11 In the Appendix, where we show all individual decisions, we also indicate how each subject is assigned to the 
different behavioral categories. 
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3. The percentage of those who reward are listed in column 4 while the percentage of those 
who sanction are listed in column 5. The sixth column, finally, consists of subjects whose 
rewarding or sanctioning behavior is very unsystematic. Most of these subjects rewarded a 
particular transfer and – at the same time – sanctioned a higher transfer.12 
  
Table 5: Individual patterns of behavior of Bs (percent)* 
 Selfish  Reward or 
sanction 
Reward and 
sanction 
Reward Sanction Other 
patterns 
I-treatment (n=33) 0 76 40 61 55 24 
NI-treatment (n=23) 30 39 18 35 22 30 
Significance of difference  
(Fisher’s exact test, p-values)  .001 .005 .052 .037 .011 .607 
 
*The classification is constructed as follows: First, all subjects who show ‘other patterns’ (column 5) are sorted 
out. This category contains (i) subjects with a negative correlation between a and b, (ii) subjects who reward a 
give-decision a > 0 while they sanctioned a higher give-decision a’ > a and (iii) subjects with an unconditional 
non-zero transfer decision. The rest of the subjects is classified into the other categories. Subjects who never 
reward or sanction (b = 0), are assigned to the first column. Subjects who reward an a > 0 at least once or 
sanction an a < 0 at least once are assigned to the second column. Subjects who reward an a > 0 at least once 
and sanction an a < 0 at least once are assigned to the third column. Subjects who reward an a > 0 at least once 
are counted in the fourth column and subjects who sanction an a < 0 at least once are assigned to column 5. 
 
Table 5 shows that individual behavioral patterns between the two treatments are quite 
different. First notice that the percentage of choices that coincides with the prediction of the 
self-interest model (b = 0, ∀a) sharply increases in the NI-treatment (30 percent) relative to 
the I-treatment (zero percent). This difference suggests that a non-negligible amount of 
reciprocal behavior is exclusively a response to fairness intentions. Subjects who would 
reward or sanction in the I-treatment refrain from doing so (and choose b = 0) because the 
actions of the As are determined randomly and do not signal any intentions. 
This interpretation is also consistent with the second result in Table 5 (see column 2): 
The percentage of subjects who are either positively or negatively reciprocal drops from 76 
percent in the I-treatment to 39 percent in the NI-treatment. This (highly significant) 
difference indicates that many reciprocal players are willing to reward or sanction only if the 
corresponding action by A signals fair or unfair intentions. However, reciprocity in the NI-
treatment is not wiped out completely. Almost 40 percent of the subjects show some 
reciprocal behavior. We take this evidence (which is in line with the regression results 
                                                 
12 Two other subjects included in this category always indicated the exact same action (but not b =0) for all 
possible transfers of player A. Note that (except for rounding errors) the sum of numbers in columns 1, 2 and 6 
adds up to 100 percent. 
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presented in Table 4) as a further indication that reciprocal behavior is not solely intention-
driven, but also by concerns for fair outcomes. 
It is also interesting to know the fraction of subjects who exhibit both positively and 
negatively reciprocal behavior. Column 3 shows that 40 percent of the subjects in the I-
condition and 18 percent in the NI-condition exhibit this pattern. Thus, the possibility to infer 
intentions also raises the percentage of subjects who exhibit both types of reciprocity 
significantly. Column 4 and 5 further support our previous conclusion that fairness intentions 
significantly increase the willingness to reciprocate and that even in the absence of fairness 
intentions there is a non-negligible percentage of people who reciprocate. 
VI. Discussion 
In his classic account of reciprocity Gouldner (1960) conjectured that the force of 
reciprocity depends on the motives imputed to the donor and the donor’s own free will. 
Although this notion of reciprocity is highly suggestive it has so far been quite difficult to 
provide direct and unambiguous evidence for the behavioral relevance of fairness intentions. 
We have discussed several potential reasons for this and designed an experiment that avoids 
potential confounds with other sources of reciprocal behavior. Our results provide clean 
evidence that in judging the fairness of an action, people do not only take into account the 
distributive consequences of an action but also the intention that is signaled by the action. 
This result not only casts serious doubt on the consequentialist practice in standard economic 
theory that defines the utility of an action solely in terms of the consequences of this action. It 
also shows that the recently developed models of fairness by Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) 
and Fehr and Schmidt (1999) are incomplete to the extent that they neglect 
“nonconsequentialist” reasons for reciprocally fair actions. Our results also show that even in 
an environment where actions do not signal any intentions, there is still some reciprocal 
behavior, i.e., the fairness of the outcome matters, too. The fact that reciprocity is not solely 
triggered by kind or unkind intentions implies that the pure intentions models of Rabin 
(1993) and Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (1999) are incomplete as well. Only models that 
combine both driving forces of reciprocal behavior (e.g., Falk and Fischbacher 1999) – are 
compatible with the observed behavioral patterns.  
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Appendix 
 
Table A1: Decisions of players A in the I-treatment 
 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Number of A-players 4 2 2 3 1 0 3 2 5 2 0 1 8 
Percentage of A-players 12 6 6 9 3 0 9 6 15 6 0 3 24 
 
 
 
Table A2: Random moves of players A in the NI-treatment 
 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Actual number of random moves 2 0 0 0 1 1 2 2 5 1 2 1 6 
Percentage of random moves 9 0 0 0 4 4 9 9 22 4 9 4 26 
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Table A3: Individual data of players B in the I- and the NI-treatment 
Treatment -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6  reward sanction 
never reward 
nor punish other patterns 
I 4 2 0 9 7 8 2 4 4 5 7 6 10  x    
I 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 3 4 5 6  x    
I 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 4 6 7 9  x    
I 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 4 6 8 10 12  x    
I 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12  x    
I 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 3 7 8 10 12  x    
I 0 0 1 1 2 2 2 3 6 6 12 12 18  x    
I -3 -2 -2 -1 -1 -4 1 1 5 6 7 5 1  x x   
I -6 -2 -3 -2 0 -1 0 0 0 1 4 7 10  x x   
I -4 -4 -4 -4 -4 -4 -1 1 2 2 3 5 6  x x   
I -5 -4 -3 -3 -2 -1 0 2 3 4 4 5 5  x x   
I -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  x x   
I -6 -5 -5 -2 -2 -1 0 2 3 5 7 8 8  x x   
I -2 -2 -2 -1 -1 -1 0 2 4 5 8 9 12  x x   
I -5 -4 -4 -4 -1 -1 0 2 4 6 8 9 11  x x   
I -4 -4 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 2 4 6 8 10 12  x x   
I -6 -5 -5 -5 -1 -1 0 2 3 6 8 10 10  x x   
I -4 -4 -4 -3 -3 -2 3 4 5 7 9 11 13  x x   
I -6 -6 -6 -5 -4 -3 0 2 4 6 8 10 12  x x   
I -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 2 4 6 8 10 12  x x   
I -6 -5 -1 -1 -2 -2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0   x   
I -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0   x   
I -3 -3 -2 -2 -1 -1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0   x   
I -5 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0   x   
I -6 -6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0   x   
I -1 17 -4 18 -3 2 -6 18 18 18 18 -6 18     x 
I 3 -4 4 -5 3 -6 1 0 -6 4 6 -2 18     x 
I -5 5 1 -4 6 0 4 3 2 -3 2 14 1     x 
I 3 -2 1 -1 0 5 2 0 3 -2 3 -4 3     x 
I 0 3 1 0 0 2 -2 0 3 0 4 0 2     x 
I -1 -6 -5 -4 -4 -3 -6 -6 -6 -6 -6 -6 -6     x 
I -6 -6 -6 -6 -6 -6 -6 -6 -6 -6 -6 -6 -6     x 
I 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12     x 
NI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 5 6 7 8  x    
NI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 3 4 6 8  x    
NI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 5 6 6 7 8  x    
NI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 4 6 8 10  x    
NI -2 -6 -4 -3 -3 -1 0 0 2 6 4 9 0  x x   
NI 0 -1 -1 -2 -1 -1 0 5 3 6 7 12 15  x x   
NI -1 -2 -3 -1 -2 -1 -1 1 2 5 7 9 11  x x   
NI -2 -1 -1 -1 0 0 0 1 2 4 5 7 8  x x   
NI -3 -3 -3 -2 -2 -1 -1 0 0 0 0 0 0   x   
NI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0    x  
NI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0    x  
NI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0    x  
NI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0    x  
NI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0    x  
NI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0    x  
NI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0    x  
NI -4 -6 8 -4 12 4 -2 10 -4 -6 2 -4 -6     x 
NI 1 8 -1 -4 6 2 0 -2 5 3 1 -5 0     x 
NI 0 3 4 1 6 3 0 1 2 -2 0 15 0     x 
NI 0 -3 -1 -2 1 2 3 4 -4 -5 5 -6 0     x 
NI 0 0 -2 3 -1 -1 0 2 4 5 0 5 0     x 
NI 2 1 1 0 -2 -3 -3 -3 -4 -5 -5 -5 -6     x 
NI 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 -1 0 0 0 0     x 
 
